* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

DNA boleh diperolehi dari semen sampai 72 jam

by The Unspinners

Anwar Ibrahim cuba invalidate bukti semen dengan menimbulkan kesangsiaan seolah-olah DNA yang diguna adalah DNA tahun 1998 dengan bahan chit chat kosong dari Malaysiakini. INi tidak susah untuk dibuktikan apabial doktor2 yang terlibat diletak sebagai saksi.

Tulisan bawah oleh Dr Novandri memberi penerangan mengenai semen dan DNA:

Ada yang bertanya penulis tentang hubungan di antara air mani yang dijumpa di dubur Saiful Bukhari dan sama ada ianya masih relevan dijadikan bukti.

Jika kita merujuk kepada Medical Forensic dan prosedur-prosedur asas pengambilan bukti-bukti untuk kes rogol dan liwat, air mani masih relevan di dalam tempoh 72 jam selepas terjadinya perbuatan tersebut.

Akan tetapi, terdapat juga journal yang mengatakan bahawa ianya boleh lebih daripada 72 jam.

Satu lagi soalan ialah apakah air mani masih boleh berada di dalam dubur Saiful Bukhari setelah 48 jam dari masa liwat (26hb - 28hb) ?

Tidak mustahil kerana kita perlu tahu bahawa jarak ejakulasi air mani itu lebih jauh ke dalam dubur dan air mani seperti berkerak dan melekat apabila kering. Dan kerak mani ini akan melekat di dalam dinding anus.

Maka, kita tidak dapat menafikan kemungkinan dakwaan peguambela Saiful Bukhari bahawa mereka dapat membuktikan wujudnya air mani di dalam dubur Saiful Bukhari atau pun mungkin tisu yang digunakan untuk membersihkan diri Saiful Bukhari atau pun Saiful tidak buang besar selepas kejadian tersebut.

Dan tidak susah untuk menentukan pemilik air mani itu kerana kita mempunyai teknologi untuk menentukan DNA yang di anggap sebagai 'fingerprint' khusus untuk setiap individu.

Peguambela Anwar Ibrahim hanya boleh menafikan dakwaan peguambela Saiful Bukhari dengan mengolah cerita bahawa air mani tersebut tidak pernah wujud dan hanya rekaan sahaja. Tetapi jika ahli kimia berjaya menyediakan bukti DNA yang sama dengan Anwar Ibrahim, Anwar Ibrahim is in deep s**t!

Soalan seterusnya, bagaimanakah Saiful Bukhari boleh mendapatkan air mani Anwar Ibrahim untuk dijadikan bukti?

Geli tapi itulah yang perlu kita fikirkan.

Sumber: Dr Novandri Hasan Basri

Disamping itu, mereka mempersoalkan lojik Saiful tidak buang air besar selama dua hari.

Apa susah sangat, semasa saya pergi buat pembedahan pun saya tidak dapat buang air besar selama 3 hari kerana saluran buang air kecil dipasang.

Tak hairan, ini dilakukan. Bukan susah kalau ada tekad dan semangat untuk usaha.

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

Road to Independence (3): Inherent tension in the Constitution

Written by Lee Kam Hing
There was the intention both in the Alliance and the Reid Commission that the provision in Article 153 on Malay special position should be transitional – i.e. reviewed 15 years after independence. Drafting the Malayan Constitution: Compromises and Consensus, 1956-57 The sequence of political events leading to independence, according to Donald Horowitz, was a factor in consolidating a coalition of ethnic-based parties that proved to be enduring. At the pre-independence stage components members of the Alliance were forced to arrive at compromises in order to present a common stand in independence discussions. And they were more willing to make concessions to one another to maintain the inter-ethnic coalition, a condition stipulated by the British before any transfer of power could take place. There were several stages in the negotiations for a new constitution. Of these the most important were the preparation of the Alliance Memorandum (April-September 1956), the Reid Commission (19 June 1956-21 February 1957), and the tripartite Working Party (22 February-27 April 1957). The Alliance Memorandum was one of several from different organisations that were submitted but it was the one which the Reid Commission paid most attention to since this came from the majority party in the Federal Legislative Council. The Alliance Memorandum was finalised after crucial concessions were obtained from all sides within the coalition. The Reid Commission was entrusted with drafting the Constitution after taking into account the views of different groups. The tripartite Working Party, which included representatives from the Alliance, the Malay rulers and the British, met between 22 February and 27 April 1957 to go through each item in the draft constitution. This was to ensure that the new constitution would be acceptable to the major communities. Some significant amendments were made at this final stage although the general structure of the draft constitution was retained. Articles in the Constitution on citizenship, Malay special position, language, and religion were the most sensitive and were closely scrutinised and debated. Throughout these discussions, Umno and the non-Malay Alliance leaders had to contend with very communal demands from radical sections of their communities. Over the years since then, these Articles in the Constitution have continued to be major sources of disagreement and a bone of contention in inter-ethnic relations. Jus soli Members of the Alliance agreed on the application of jus soli for citizenship so that those born in the Federation after independence became citizens and non-residents could qualify by fulfilling residence, language and oath of loyalty requirements. This liberal citizenship requirement was a major concession from the Malays because with this agreement, large number of non-Malays became citizens. The Alliance, which insisted on a single nationality, also eventually accepted the Reid Commission’s inclusion of modified dual-citizenship especially for those from the Straits Settlements who were British subjects.26 In exchange for liberalising citizenship requirements, non-Malay leaders in the Alliance accepted the special position of the Malays. Umno wanted to continue with Malay privileges as provided under the Federation of Malaya Agreement through provisions for Malay reservation land, operation of quotas within the public services, quotas for licenses and permits for certain businesses, and quotas for public scholarship and education grants. Malay special position There was the intention both in the Alliance and the Reid Commission that the provision in Article 157 (becoming Article 153 in the final version of the Constitution) on Malay special position should be transitional. In the earlier drafts of the Alliance memorandum it was stated that the special position provision in the Constitution would be reviewed 15 years after independence. However, this was omitted in the final version to avoid criticisms from Malay organisations although it was conveyed orally to the Reid Commission. The majority of members in the Reid Commission was uncomfortable with the provision in the Alliance Memorandum as they considered it incompatible with democracy and fundamental rights Amendments were made to Article 157 at the tripartite talks in April 1957. As a result of strong UMNO representation, it was decided that the special position of the Malays be reviewed from time to time instead of a stated fixed period. The Agong would have the responsibility for safeguarding the “special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities”.27 Furthermore, Article 157 was also transferred from the transitional provisions of the Constitution to the permanent section at the final meeting of the Working Party on 27 April 1957. It was also decided that the government should have the flexibility to extend the areas classified as Malay reservations.28 MCA was unhappy with the amendment made to Article 157. Its representatives to the talks had failed to realize the implications particularly that future amendments to Articles in the permanent section of the Constitution required a two-thirds majority of total number of members of each House of Parliament. Nevertheless, this transfer was made on an understanding that the White Paper to be tabled at the Federal Legislative meeting should include a statement that “it is considered in the interests of the country and in the interests of the Malays themselves that the provisions of Article 157 should be reviewed from time to time”.29 Furthermore, following MCA’s expression of concern that Article 157 provision should be carefully worded, it was agreed that a protective clause be included which stated that “Nothing in this article shall empower Parliament to restrict or control any trade or business just for the sake of creating quotas for Malays”30. Islam It was at the tripartite negotiations that an Article making Islam the official religion of the Federation was introduced. The majority in the Reid Commission had favoured retaining religion as a state matter. They feared that providing an official religion, as proposed earlier in the Alliance memorandum, was a contradiction to the status of a secular state. Tunku Abdul Rahman, under pressure from Umno, argued that the inclusion of Article 3 was important psychologically to the Malays. However in recognising the objections of the rulers and the concerns of non-Malays, two provisos were included in the Article. The Article, accordingly, would not affect the position of the rulers in their respective states as head of Islam and the practice and propagation of other religions in the Federation would be assured.31 Although there were strong objections from non-Muslim organisations to the Article, the MCA and the MIC were assured by Umno that Islam was intended to have only symbolic significance and for ceremonial purposes only, and that the rights of the non-Muslims would not be affected. Article 11 guaranteed the right of the citizens to “profess, practise and propagate” their religion. The Federation would be a secular state.32 Language There was also a compromise on language. The Alliance agreed to Umno’s proposal that Malay be the official language but that there would be no objections to the use of Chinese and Tamil for unofficial purposes. The Tunku also assured Chinese educationalists that Chinese schools, language and culture would be preserved. The tripartite Working Party agreed to a proviso in Article 140 on language allowing the teaching and learning of Chinese and Tamil. English was to be retained as official language for ten years after independence and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provided. Finally, the Malay rulers were to be constitutional monarchs and they would act on the advice of the Cabinet. In the tripartite meeting it was agreed that the rulers would be consulted on matters affecting their positions, territorial changes, changes affecting the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities, and in the appointment of important commissions such as the Election Commission and the Public Service commission. Conclusion Consensus was reached among the leaders at the constitutional talks on what were undoubtedly sensitive and difficult issues. Efforts were made to ensure that the core interests of all the communities were safeguarded. Though the constitutional provisions did not satisfy everyone there were key compromises made which enabled the members of the Alliance to work together towards independence. The Constitution which the founding leaders of Malaysia helped bring to fruition has since the provided the parameters of all subsequent discourses on inter-ethnic relations. But over the years, the inherent tension in a number of Articles of the Constitution have surfaced. Members of the various communities have claimed that the interests of their constituencies as provided in the Constitution had not been protected or advanced and these concerns have been taken up by opposition parties and even component members of the ruling coalition. There have also been calls for review of some of the provisions in the Constitution. At the same time, some Malays have argued that the community was not receiving the full benefits of their special position in exchange for granting citizenship to non-Malays. While non-Malays were granted immediate citizenship, the Malay community was still lagging behind economically and Malay was not as widely used as the official language. Many non-Malays, on their part, perceive that the Constitution has favoured the Malays and want to redress the bias so as to ensure fairer access to educational and employment opportunities in the government sector as well for to bring about the wider use of other languages and the development of vernacular-language schools. So long as the founding leaders were still around and the mystique of the Alliance as the party of independence remained, it was possible to contain the deep unhappiness of all communities. The hope of the early leaders was that with economic growth and equitable distribution, a maturing democracy, and continued inter-ethnic cooperation, the contentious issues would gradually fade away. Inter-ethnic cooperation was forged during a period of political transition in the pre-independence years. Donald Horowitz contends that the sequence of events was decisive in the formation of the Alliance and in the willingness of leaders of the component parties to reach agreement during constitutional talks. Prior to the Alliance, there had been efforts at inter-ethnic cooperation and thus when Umno and MCA formalised their partnership it was not an entirely new or uncharted experience. Horowitrz suggested that the Alliance could be looked upon as a creation of chance “a curious and irreplicable combination of circumstances”. There was the Emergency and British colonial policy which pushed Umno and MCA together; that elections were held first for town councils where voters were mainly Chinese, and that there were no strong competing communal parties. In these circumstances, Umno as the leading Malay party was willing to reach across ethnic lines to work with the MCA in order to defeat the IMP, its main threat. Umno leaders also realized that the British required inter-ethnic cooperation before a further political transition would take place. The Chinese on their part were forced to be restrained in their demands because the Emergency, which was seen as supported largely by Chinese, had placed the community under a political cloud. And after the 1955 elections when they had less seats than Umno, they realized that their bargaining position was weaker.33 Horowitz also argued that leaders of the Alliance had time to develop a close relationship even before they needed to face ‘divisive’ issues. The electoral battles they fought together and the difficulties they encountered with the colonial authorities bonded them in friendship. They were willing to make compromises in a spirit of give and take in order to maintain a united front when negotiating with the colonial authorities for independence. Fifty years after independence there is a need to renew our understanding of how leaders of the various ethnic groups came together to create a political coalition, to relearn of the different stages in the drafting of the Constitution, and to be aware of what the founding leaders agreed on with regard to citizenship, Malay special position, the place of Islam in this country, education and language, and the role of the Malay rulers. There must be appreciation that the Constitution was drawn up in a context of compromise and consensus so as to forge a united front in the fight for independence. Today there is an urgency to retrieve and regain that spirit of mutual respect and understanding to build a cohesive Malaysia that can thrive in an increasingly globalising and competitive world. Parts 1 & 2 appeared on Feb 5-6. Dr Lee Kam Hing’s essay is originally titled ‘Forging Inter-ethnic Cooperation: The Political and Constitutional Process towards Independence, 1951-1957’ and published in the book Multiethnic Malaysia — Past Present and Future (2009). CPI with permission from the author is reproducing his essay in three parts for online reading in our website. Today’s Part 3 is as above. Dr Lee is research director at Star Publications. He was visiting Harvard-Yenching research scholar at Harvard University, and visiting scholar at Wofson College, Cambridge University. He was previously history professor of Universiti Malaya. Articles on pre-Merdeka race composition: ‘Malaysianisation’ of the Melayu identity A plural peninsula or Tanah Melayu? (1) A plural peninsula or Tanah Melayu? (2) Footnotes: 26 Those who held an additional nationality were given a year to decide if they wanted federation nationality while the introduction of a Commonwealth citizenship status allowed Commonwealth countries to grant certain privileges to citizens from other countries. Joseph Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution, pp. 124-126, pp.160-161. 27 Ibid, p.164 28 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.177-179 29 Joseph Fernando, The Making of the Malaysian Constitution, p.164 30 Ibid 31 Tun Mohd Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1976, pp.245-249; H.P.Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.4-21 32 K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965, pp.117-126 33 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985 pp.396-440 Bibliography Adnan Hj Mohd Nawang, Za’ba (Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad) dan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn Bhd, 1998 Ampalavanar, R., The Indian Minority and Political Change in Malaya, 1945-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981 Arasaratnam, S., Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London: Institute of Race Relations, 1967 Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-1950, Oxford University Press, 1993 Cheah Boon Kheng, The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002 Cloake, J. Templer: Tiger of Malaya, London: Harrap, 1985 Clutterbuck, R., Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, London: Faber and Faber, 1973 Emerson, Rupert, E., Malaysia: A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964 Fernando, J.M., The Making of the Malayan Constitution, Kuala Lumpur Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No 31, 2002 Firdaus Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1985 Funston, J., Malay Politics in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980 Furnivall, J.S., Netherlands India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939 Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971 Heng Pek Khoon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988 Heussler, Robert, Completing a Stewardship, London: Greenwood Press, 1983 Hickling, R.H., An Introduction to the Federal Constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1960 Horowitz, D.L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985 Loh Kok Wah, Francis, Beyond the Tin Mines, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988 Husin Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990 Means, G.P. Malaysian Politics, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976 Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1974 Mohamed Suffian Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1972 Mohamed Suffian Hashim, Lee, H.P. and Trindale, F.A. (eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978 Ramlah Adam, Dato’ Onn Ja’afar: Pengasas Kemerdekaan, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustakaa, 1993 Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965 Roff, W.R., The Origins of Malaya Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967 Sheridan, L.A. and Groves, H.E., The Constitution of Malaysia, Singapore: Malayan Law Journal Stockwell, Anthony J., Malaya, London: HMSO, 1995 Stubbs, Richard, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989 Tan Liok Ee, The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: Community and Nations in Tension, the Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955, Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1988

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

The ideal of a united Malaysia is under strain

SPECIAL REPORTS

 

Queensland University political scientist David Martin Jones, currently working in Malaysia, says: “There is now an interesting collection of scandals dating from the first Anwar case in 1998 that coincides with the fragmentation of Umno-controlled politics.”

The Australian

What’s happening with Malaysia? The country has long been viewed in Australia as not only an especially friendly Southeast Asian neighbour — the “recalcitrant” Mahathir Mohammad excepted, though he’s been retired six years — but also a model of middle-class success and tolerance in that region.

Today, however, the country is having a hard time holding things together, in the face of religious and ethnic divides, political battles, and economic challenges.

Michael Danby, who chairs Australia’s foreign affairs subcommittee, told parliament last Tuesday night that “fellow democrats around Asia are flabbergasted at events unfolding in Kuala Lumpur.”

He was referring to the second trial of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for sodomy.

“For the second time,” Danby said, “the Malaysian legal system is being manipulated by supporters of the incumbent government to drive Malaysia’s best-known leader, Anwar Ibrahim, out of national politics.

“For the second time, documents are being forged, witnesses are being coerced, and evidence is being fabricated. This trial, like the first trial, is a disgrace to Malaysia, a country that aspires to democratic norms.”

Danby said it was long past time that Malaysia repealed these British colonial laws, which could not then be used for such political purposes.

“In the second place, everyone in Malaysia, and everyone in the international legal community, knows that Anwar is innocent of these charges.”

The underlying problem is that Anwar, leader of the People’s Justice Party, is the first charismatic Malay opposition politician with sufficient appeal for Malay voters to pose a real threat to Umno’s 52-year hold on power.

This episode indicates that it’s also long past time Umno took a spell in opposition, as Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party is doing.

Declared a middle-income country by the World Bank several years ago, Malaysia has grown accustomed to patronising its giant neighbour Indonesia — even though it still rankles that Malaysia itself continues to be patronised by its tiny neighbour Singapore.

Now, though, it is Indonesia — the raucous democracy with a rapidly acquired capacity to change leaders and governments peaceably, the world’s largest Muslim country renowned for its moderation and pluralism — that is receiving international praise, with US President Barack Obama flying across the world to visit (with a side-trip to Australia).

In 2008, last year and — as estimated by IMA Asia — this year, Malaysia’s economic growth figures are 4.6 per cent, -2.8 per cent, and 4 per cent. Indonesia’s are 6.1 per cent, 4.5 per cent and 5.6 per cent.

Since taking office last April, Prime Minister Najib Razak has started to dismantle the 40-year-old New Economic Policy, Sydney-based business consulting firm IMA notes.

It says: “While the NEP did little for ordinary Malays, its supposed beneficiaries, it enriched a handful of businessmen and contributed to corruption in Umno.”

Najib also has to tackle the over-reliance on oil money — for more than 40 per cent of government revenues — while just 2.3 million of the 28 million population pay income tax. And he needs to open more sectors of the economy to foreign investors.

That’s hard to do, while at the same time grappling with the plethora of problems resulting from Malaysia’s restrictive religious laws, reflecting Islam’s role as the state religion.

Queensland University political scientist David Martin Jones, currently working in Malaysia, says: “There is now an interesting collection of scandals dating from the first Anwar case in 1998 that coincides with the fragmentation of Umno-controlled politics.”

One such scandal comprised the tragic case of Lina Joy, aged 45, who was born into a Muslim family but began attending a church in 1990 and was baptised in 1998, and naturally wished to marry her Christian fiance. But marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is forbidden under Malaysian law, and after years of battling the authorities in the courts, in 2007 she was refused permission to convert formally.

This year, Malaysia has seen its simmering religious and racial conflicts boil over after a ruling of the High Court that the Malay language pages of the Catholic Church’s weekly newspaper, the Herald, could use the term “Allah” as a translation for “God”.

Malaysian Christians say they have used “Allah” for God for centuries.

The government is appealing the decision. But in the meantime, it has triggered violent protests from Muslim Malays who comprise 60 per cent of the population, and who claim exclusive rights over the Arabic word “Allah”. Christians comprise just 9 per cent of Malaysians.

Eleven churches, a Sikh temple and two Muslim prayer rooms have been attacked so far, as a result of the row, and the severed heads of three wild boars — considered unclean by Muslims — with their mouths stuffed with bank notes, in plastic bags, were found outside two mosques.

The High Court last April sentenced to death two policemen who were assigned to the office of Najib Razak, the then deputy prime minister and defence minister. They were found guilty of murdering a Mongolian woman who had had a relationship with Abdul Razak Baginda, a defence analyst for a think tank, and had translated for him on a deal to buy submarines from France.

Abdul Razak, arrested for abetting the murder, was acquitted. But the motives for the policemen to have killed Atlantuyaa — by explosives — remain murky.

Martin Jones says: “Malay political scandals and the cynicism they engender, together with the bitter debate over the ‘Allah affair’, are seriously fragmenting the Malay community, whilst minority communities are increasingly rejecting the Umno model of Satu Malaysia (1 Malaysia). I suspect this portends some trouble ahead for the Malay political process.”

Razak has launched a multimedia 1 Malaysia campaign to promote the virtues of “perseverance, a culture of excellence, acceptance, loyalty, education, humility, integrity, and meritocracy.”

This looks to be a hurdle too high for a political establishment whose credibility is too low, for an economy that for two years has suffered net outflows of foreign investment, and for a culture suffering some confusion.

Jones points out: “It’s somewhat ironic that an ostensibly puritanical political culture that won’t contemplate a Beyonce concert seems to lap up details of Anwar’s alleged penetration of his aide.”

The singer Beyonce last October cancelled a second planned concert in Malaysia after accusations by Islamic conservatives that her show was immoral. She scored a huge hit when she flew instead to a Muslim neighbour with less stringent rules on dress or behaviour: Indonesia.

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

Don't be Judgmental.......... Don't Judge too quickly

by Aizley Shahar


 something to ponder about.....

A young lady was waiting for her flight in the boarding room of a big airport. As she would need to wait many hours, she decided to buy a book to spend her time. She also bought a packet of cookies. She sat down in an armchair, in the VIP room of the airport, to rest and read in peace. Beside the armchair where the packet of cookies lay, a man sat down in the next seat, opened his magazine and started reading. When she took out the first cookie, the man took one also. She felt irritated but said nothing. She just thought: "What a nerve! If I was in the mood I would punch him for daring!" For each cookie she took, the man took one too. This was infuriating her but she didn't want to cause a scene. When only one cookie remained, she thought: "ah... What this abusive man do now?" Then, the man, taking the last cookie, divided it into half, giving her one half. Ah! That was too much! She was much too angry now! In a huff, she took her book, her things and stormed to the boarding place. When she sat down in her seat, inside the plane, she looked into her purse to take her eyeglasses, and to her surprise, her packet of cookies was there, untouched, unopened! She felt so ashamed! She realized that she was wrong... She had forgotten that her cookies were kept in her purse. The man had divided his cookies with her, without feeling angered or bitter. "While she had been very angry, thinking that she was dividing her cookies with him. And now there was no chance to explain herself, nor to apologize." There are 4 things that you cannot recover: The stone... after the throw! The word... palaver...after it's said! The occasion...after the loss! The time...after it's gone!

we don't have the right to judge people cos we don't know what's the real and true story behind it...

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

What’s Dr M talking about Melayu?

Contributors

Written by Helen Ting

Introduction by Dr Lim Teck Ghee Dr Mahathir Mohamad has recently been giving distorted history lessons on minority populations. To top these rants, he even sounded almost regretful when he opined that the Holocaust had ostensibly “failed” in its ‘Final Solution’ to reduce the ‘Jewish problem’ beyond the six million loss of life. On January 28 in his reflections on Malaysian minorities, he claimed in the same regretful tone that “one million outsiders were given citizenships” during Independence. Awareness of history is always illuminating. However, instead of getting our knowledge of what really happened in our history from Mahathir and the propagandists of the Biro Tatanegara, Malaysians should take the opportunity to learn from reputed local and foreign scholars. This is not only because these researchers are more accurate and objective in their writings - having spent much of their lives studying and verifying the key historical events and developments, and going through the process of the results of their scholarly work being peer reviewed by other scholars. It is also because unlike Dr Mahathir and other propagandists of the official history, they do not have the same political agenda and racial bias that Dr Mahathir and his subordinates bring to the subject matter. With these scholars, we can be confident that our worry about the distortions that are being bandied about by Mahathir – based on either ignorance or more likely opportunism if not blatant prejudice – are at least not present. About the (in Dr M’s eyes) ‘immigrant problem’ Based on the Malaya 1947 census, 2.2 million of the population were Malays born in Malaya. Aside from Malays, this census also classed those of aboriginal and Indonesian ethnicities as ‘Malaysian’. Does Mahathir simply consider those not born in Malaya to be “outsiders”? Among the ‘Malaysians’ counted in 1947 were 187,755 Javanese born in Java, 62,356 Bandjarese born in Borneo and another 20,429 Boyanese born in Sumatera. The Minangkabau, Bugis and other ethnicities born in other Indonesian islands made up roughly 35,000 persons. So how does Mahahir define “outsiders”? Consider the first comprehensive census taken in British Malaya in 1911 when the total population was enumerated to be about 2.65 million. Of this number, 46.8 percent were classed as Malay, 34.7 percent Chinese, 10.1 percent Indian, and the rest ‘Malaysians’ (aboriginal) and ‘others’. What then does he make of the near 35 percent Chinese and 10 percent Indian who were already on this land 100 years ago in 1911? Or of those of Peranakan descent in the Straits Settlements who can trace their ancestry back generations – many to as long ago as between 200 and 500 years? Or of the long-settled and assimilated Chinese in Terengganu who were already successfully cultivating pepper in the 17th century? Rather than Mahathir’s claim that the horde of “outsiders” at the gates were being handed citizenship on a silver platter, the truth of the matter is that Umno pressured for citizenship criteria to be made very stringent. Following the scuttling of the Malayan Union plan, the subsequent negotiations for Independence in fact disenfranchised many Chinese and Indians who would otherwise have been eligible under the terms of the 1946 citizenship initiative. Certainly, a historical perspective on the shaping of Malay identity and this country’s mixed population will be enlightening. It should also be an eye-opener to the small band of politicians and agititors – such as the Kimma group in Penang – currently proclaiming Ketuanan Melayu the loudest. Political scientist Dr Helen Ting for instance, points out that the term ‘Malayu’ was initially associated with the Palembang-based, Buddhist Srivijayan kingdom, which existed from the 7th to 13th centuries. ‘Malayu’ was earlier neither the name of a people nor a language. Most foreigners referred to the inhabitants of the archipelago as Jawa. The name Nusantara was first used by the early Javanese Kingdoms to denote the area outside the political influence of Javanese culture, but still under their suzerainty, she writes. Among the discussions on bangsa Melayu during the nascent period of Malay nationalism was the issue of descent (keturunan). Ting cites Abdul Rahim Kajai, a renowned Malay journalist and writer, as arguing that bangsa Melayu should only consist of those of paternal Malay descent. Kajai’s definition would necessarily exclude Mahathir from the fold of the Malay race. We feel it pertinent to reproduce Ting’s essays on these topics to stimulate a more enlightened discourse so that we can all better understand the real history of how we came to be as a nation. This will enable us not to be blindly taken in by those who have little knowledge of our history but are prepared to distort it for their selfish reasons. ********************************************************* ‘Malaysianisation’ of the Melayu identity By Helen Ting Many of the arguments used regarding Malay identity are really peculiarly ‘Malaysian’ in dissonance with the wider reality and history. For instance, most of us would presume, or are told that all indigenous Indonesians are culturally Malay. However, in Indonesia, the term Melayu typically denotes only one ethnic group among others. Even a person as learned as the director-general of Ikim, Dr Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas, fell into the trap of erroneously claiming that “the Malay language is derived from the Arabic language,” which he characterised as “the language of identity for the Malays.” Syed Ali also said that “the Malays are Malays because of Islam.” He is unaware that the earliest issue of contention in the modern definition of Bangsa Melayu was the issue of descent (keturunan) versus Islam. Abdul Rahim Kajai, a prominent Malay journalist and writer, argued that bangsa Melayu should only consist of those of paternal Malay descent and stressed that “Islam does not designate a bangsa.” As late as June 1939, Utusan Melayu called Muslim organisations of jawi peranakan membership who identified themselves as Malays as musang berbulu ayam. The term Malayu was initially associated with the Palembang-based, Buddhist Srivijayan Kingdom, which existed between the 7th to 13th centuries. Malayu was then neither the name of a people nor a language. Most foreigners referred to the inhabitants of the archipelago as Jawa or Yava. The Malay language as the lingua franca of the region was initially referred to as Jawi or Bahasa Jawi. It was a living language which was enriched with loan words from Sanskrit, Javanese, Arabic, Tamil, Mon, Chinese and Persian languages. In parts of eastern Indonesia, “masuk Melayu” actually meant becoming Christian. Christianity was associated with the development of an earlier literary Malay style there, due to the proselytisation activities conducted in Malay by Portuguese missionaries, and its subsequent adoption as the language of the Dutch colonial administration. Christian Ambonese villagers abandoned their indigenous languages in favour of Malay due to the Malay-language Christian schooling and bible literacy acquired in the Malay language. Islamic influence The penetration of Islamic influence into the region, including the Melaka Empire which was founded as a Hindu Kingdom, was decisive in introducing the Arabic-based orthography as well as Arabic vocabulary into the language. James Collins, a professor of Malayo-Polynesian Linguistics, also suggests that the establishment of anti-Islamic Portuguese power in Melaka had led to the “strengthening, or at least the affirmation, of Muslim-Malay identity” and had “perceptible effect on the spread of Malay-speaking Islam.” The term Melayu in the Melaka kingdom initially designated solely the royal descent of its ruling elites. The notion of Melayu then was associated with the mystic pedigree of kingship descending from Srivijaya and Melaka or Pagarruyung (Minangkabau). Its cosmopolitan population related hierarchically to the ruling elite as orang Melaka or hamba/anak Melayu. The prosperity and authority of the Melaka Kingdom had endowed the name Melayu with great prestige associated with maritime trade. The death of the last Johor Sultan who claimed direct lineage to the Melakan royalty in 1699 unleashed political struggle by competing groups for the right to assume the Melayu identity associated with power in the region. A historian, Timorthy Barnard, contends that the Malayness as understood during this period “was not associated with Islam, although religion did play a part; it was based instead on a common trading culture along the Melaka Straits and South China Sea.” Meantime, a parallel dynamic was developing in places further away from the Straits of Melaka. After the fall of the Melaka port city in 1511, Portuguese hostility towards its Muslim inhabitants resulted in their exile throughout the archipelago, in search of new bases of operation. During the 16th and 17th centuries, these migrants appeared to have given rise to a new connotation of Malayness: “a commercial diaspora that retained some of the customs, language and trade practices developed in the emporium of Melaka.” This Malay-speaking Muslim trading diaspora dispersed by the Portuguese conquest composed of widely differing genetic stock: Javanese, ‘Luzons’, Chinese, Gujerati, South Indian, Ryukyuan. Unlike the stereotypical association of the Malays as peasants and fishermen during the colonial era, early Melayu diaspora were primarily traders. The 17th century Melayu community on the island of Sumbawa asked to be exempted from port duties instead of being rewarded with rice fields, because “we are sailors and traders, not peasants.” An exiled prince from Siak in the 18th century who was a claimant to the Melayu identity, described himself and his followers as “children of the sea”, “comfortable with riding the waves.” Subsequently, becoming a Melayu appeared to be increasingly based on the allegiance as a subject to a particular Malay ruler. Anthony Milner, the proponent of this thesis, suggests that Hikayat Deli and other Malay hikayat had served as teaching manuals for the acculturation of new adherents to such Melayu identity. European records of the 19th century indicated evidences of a process of “Malayisation” whereby animist Bataks embraced Islam and adopted Malay culture: learning and speaking the Malay language, wearing Malay costume, acquiring a “Malay imagery” and acting and thinking in a Malay style. Reversible identity Interestingly, this Melayu identity was actually reversible and changeable. There were instances whereby those who adopted the Melayu identity reverted back to their original social identity. It was also not uncommon for the subjects of a cruel sultan to flee and shift allegiance to another Raja. Notably, Milner did not regard the whole nusantara as “the Malay world”, but only clusters of Malay polities, each under the rule of a Malay Raja. In fact, the name Nusantara was first used by the early Javanese Kingdoms to denote the area outside the political influence of Javanese culture, but still under their suzerainty. The current concept of race and nation was clearly an epistemological heritage of the European civilisation. It was Stamford Raffles who first described the Malayu as a ‘nation.’ Raffles also renamed the Malay chronicle, Sulalat Us-Salatin (in Arabic) or Peraturan segala raja-raja (in Malay) as Sejarah Melayu, as if it was the story of a people. Then again, Stamford was merely referring to the population under coastal maritime sultanates and not the entire population of the archipelago. British colonialism was instrumental in introducing the categorisation of the Malay people as a race, and Malaya as Tanah Melayu. As late as the 1930s, leaders of the Malay State Associations admitted only anak negeri as their members. Recent migrants from the surrounding islands, the anak dagang, were barred from joining the associations. In fact, Ibrahim Yaacob who attempted to propagate a Malay nation covering the whole archipelago complained that most of those who migrated from the surrounding islands did not identify themselves as Malays. Even local Malays tended to be more attached to their respective state identity, calling themselves orang Kelantan, orang Perak, etc. rather than as Malays. It is indeed a point to ponder how the historical fluidity of the Melayu identity as well as its vitality has been rendered so rigid and peculiarly “Malaysian.”

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

Road to Independence (2): MCA’s missed opportunity

History

Written by Lee Kam Hing

Why did Umno and MCA to work together? Why did Tan Cheng Lock break off with Onn Jaafar? Could the whole political scenario for the country have taken a different direction in the early 1950s? Local elections: The demise of the IMP and the emergence of the Alliance Party, 1952 In late 1951, local elections were introduced in Malaya to prepare the country for self-government. The first election was in Penang in December 1951. But it was in Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital and where IMP was contesting for the first time, that the elections in February 1952, attracted wide interest. The Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which fielded candidates in all 12 wards seemed formidable, having on its side Onn Jaafar, founder-leader of Umno, and Tan Cheng Lock, founder-leader of the MCA. Several other senior MCA leaders including Tan Siew Sin, Khoo Teik Ee and Yong Shook Lin were with the IMP too. The IMP was also supported by the MIC. Selangor MCA, then headed by H.S. Lee, reached an agreement with Dato Yahya Razak, chairman of KL Umno’s election committee to field a single slate of candidates. Lee’s election manifesto which was released on 3 January stated that “the MCA Selangor Branch are also of the opinion that the interests of members of other communities should also be represented”. This had attracted Yahya’s attention. He thereupon contacted a former school-mate Ong Yoke Lin, another MCA leader, who then fixed a meeting of representatives from Umno and MCA. On 7 January both sides agreed to fight jointly in the elections. The alliance fielded 5 Malays, 6 Chinese, and 1 Indian.12 The KL electoral pact was an entirely local initiative but the alliance drew strong criticisms not only from IMP but also from some MCA and Umno national leaders. Yahya Razak’s own division head Datin Putih Mariah resigned on 10 February just days before elections in protest at the pact. There were objections from other branches and Yahya was accused of selling out the Malays by working with a Chinese party. On the MCA side, two senior leaders Tan Siew Sin and Khoo Teik Ee declared during the elections campaign that the party’s central working committee had not approved the Umno-MCA merger and both instead called for support of the IMP. For MCA this was its first experience in participating in elections while for Umno it needed to improve on its Penang performance where it won only one seat. Both Lee and Yahya saw the elections initially as a battle for control of the KL Municipal and focused on local issues. But the elections turned out to be a test of strength between Onn Jaafar’s multi-racial IMP and the communally-based Umno and MCA, and soon questions of self-government and larger political concerns were raised.13 To the surprise of some observers, the Umno-MCA alliance defeated the IMP by winning 9 of the 12 seats at the KL elections. Contemporary commentaries while suggesting that the “MCA-Umno victory is superficially proof that the Malays and the Chinese can work together for political ends” noted that voting was along ethnic lines for both parties.14 Although the electorate numbered only about 11,000 and turnout was 75%, the result was a major boost to the new alliance and it marked the beginning of IMP’s demise. The new alliance of Umno-MCA maintained its winning momentum and swept municipal elections held in the rest of the country later that year. Formalising inter-ethnic cooperation in the Alliance, 1952-53 As observed, inter-ethnic cooperation in Malaya could have taken either the multi-racial IMP form or in the form of a coalition of communal-based parties. Tan Cheng Lock, on his part, remained cautious about an Umno-MCA alliance. He believed that several important issues had to be resolved before he was agreeable to formalising Umno-MCA collaboration. He wanted to find out whether Tunku Abdul Rahman, the new leader of Umno, accepted jus soli in relation to the citizenship issue and the concept of a Malaya for Malayans. Writing to H.S. Lee on 29 February Tan explained that “there must be communal equality in the Federation involving equality of opportunity and treatment and in shouldering the duties and in sharing the rights of Malaya Citizenship among all the domicile communities making up the population of Malaya.”15 Tan and other mainly Western-educated MCA leaders had initially embraced Onn’s non-racial IMP and saw it as moderate compared to Umno. In particular Tan appreciated Onn’s willingness to stake his position as Umno president by insisting on liberalising citizenship requirements and opening the party to non-Malays. It would appear that in 1952, the IMP with its multiracial platform as well as the quiet backing by the British was the preferred party to work with for some of the senior leaders of MCA. The IMP too was supported by the MIC. Many MCA leaders were unsure of the untested Tunku who had taken over Umno in August 1951. Then why did Tan break off with Onn? Some studies criticized Tan for letting Onn down. If Tan and the MCA had sided with IMP instead of Umno, could the whole political scenario for the country have changed? Could we have a situation of a dominant or competing multi-racial parties instead of a coalition of ethnic parties leading the independence movement. H.S. Lee favoured expanding the Umno-MCA alliance. In the weeks after the KL elections, Lee was in regular contact with the Tunku. The Tunku was the first to congratulate Lee on the KL election results. On 22 February Lee informed Tan that the Tunku favoured enlarging the alliance into a nation-wide organisation and that the Umno leader would be asking party heads to contact the various local MCA branches.16 H.S. Lee’s role in events affecting Umno-MCA alliance was crucial. He was worried about the continued association of Tan Cheng Lock with the IMP. On 22 March 1952 he wrote to Tan that senior MCA state leaders had expressed to him their deep concern about Tan calling an inaugural IMP Malacca meeting, and there was a possibility that he would be made state chairman while still leader of the MCA. More importantly, Lee wrote, “They feel that if you accept the Presidency of the IMP in Malacca, it might not be conducive for frank discussions with the Umno in the future.”17 Unwilling to abandon Onn and the IMP, Tan proposed giving MCA branches the right to work with either IMP or Umno. Speaking to the press on 18 February 1952, Tan declared, “I support the principle of IMP-MCA-Umno cooperation”.18 To Lee on 22 February he explained, “You are materially aware that influential members of the MCA want cooperation with IMP. So probably the MCA is divided on this question”.19 Umno, which regarded IMP as its main rival, would certainly not have accepted Tan’s proposition. And neither did Lee and the more politically conservative Chinese. Writing to Tan on 1 March 1952 Lee revealed that the Tunku indicated to him privately that he accepted jus soli although there was a minority within Umno strongly opposed to such a concession. It might have been, as some writers had argued, that Lee preferred an Umno-MCA alliance because he and Onn were not on good personal terms. But correspondence at the end of 1951 showed that there was cordiality between the two leaders and even after IMP’s inaugural meeting Onn again invited Lee to join IMP.20 Rather, Lee did not believe that the multi-racial IMP could get popular support. On 18 February 1952, Lee wrote that “...it seems unlikely that the IMP will be able to achieve any success elsewhere. Indeed they have obtained the two seats [in Kuala Lumpur] by a very small margin (50 odd votes)...” 21 Lee’s stand was more likely influenced by his association with groups in the MCA which were worried about the future of Chinese education, language, and citizenship. These groups believed that the Chinese were politically weak and divided, and a distinctly Chinese party was therefore needed to safeguard the community’s interest especially at a time when British policies were interpreted as anti-Chinese. They therefore believed that MCA’s future could best be pursued by retaining its identity, and therefore an alliance with another communal party like Umno was a more suitable and workable option.22 Lee managed to eventually bring Tan to his viewpoint. On 5 March, Lee alerted Tan to the Select Committee’s Report on the Immigration Ordinance of 1950. Onn was a signatory to the Majority Report with recommendations unfavourable to the Chinese and this was opposed by Chinese members of the Legislative Council. Lee therefore raised doubts in the mind of Tan about Onn’s commitment to multi-racial fairness.23 Eventually, Tunku and Tan Cheng Lock met on 18 March. After several more rounds of talks involving other MCA leaders, a nation-wide Umno-MCA alliance was institutionalised. Consolidating inter-ethnic coalition, 1953-55 The Umno-MCA alliance could have turned out to be no more than a temporary arrangement of convenience. Given that the first real electoral contest took place in Kuala Lumpur which was largely Chinese-majority, Umno found it necessary to work with MCA to defeat its rival, the IMP. Had elections been held elsewhere where Chinese votes were insignificant, there might not have been a reason for Umno to seek a Chinese electoral partner. Nevertheless 1952 it was more than just electoral battles that led Umno and MCA to work together. They now had to forge a common front to negotiate with the British on constitutional change.24 In March 1953 the coalition declared that its aim was to achieve self-government and eventual independence in Malaya. As a first step, the Alliance called for elections to the Federal Legislative Council and for at least 60 per cent of seats be elected directly by the people. Up until then, Council’s members had all been nominated The Alliance leaders encountered resistance from the British over their demands for political reforms. The British still favoured the non-communal IMP and disregarded the political strength of the Alliance as revealed in the elections. Furthermore, some colonial administrations were not convinced that Malaya was ready for independence and they anticipated a long period of British mandated rule. On 1 February 1954 the committee set up by the colonial administration to look into federal elections recommended that only 44 of the 92 members of the Federal Legislative Council, or less than half, would be elected. Significantly too, the committee did not recommend early elections. On further discussions, the number of elected seats was raised to 52 out of 98 seats. But Alliance leaders rejected the proposal and sent a delegation to raise the matter with the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Oliver Lyttelton. The Secretary of State turned down the request for 60 per cent of elected members. In reaction, the Alliance called for an independent commission to consider constitutional reforms, failing which they would carry out a boycott of the government and withdraw all its representatives from the legislature, municipal, and town councils. This request was rejected and the Alliance members went ahead with the boycott. They organised a nation-wide demonstration and also met the Malay rulers to get support. The boycott forced the British to come to a compromise. The Colonial Office proposed that five seats that would have been nominated by the High Commissioner should now be decided by the majority party in the Council. These five seats could then ensure an elected majority at the Federal Legislative Council.25 In July 1955 the first federal elections were held. Dato Onn had disbanded the IMP and formed Parti Negara to contest the elections. The inter-ethnic Alliance coalition fielded candidates in all seats and in its manifesto promised that it would seek early independence. Now joined by the MIC, the Alliance won 51 of the 52 seats. It formed the first locally-elected government with Tunku Abdul Rahman as the first Chief Minister. After the elections, the Alliance called on the British Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, to set up an independent commission to draw up a Constitution as a step towards independence for Malaya. Lennox-Boyd soon afterwards invited the Alliance to send a delegation for discussions in London. Alliance leaders gained national support and prominence from the 1955 elections and won the right to negotiate for independence. They had enhanced their political position by taking a strong stand together against the colonial administration over the issue of federal elections. They were willing to risk detention by their boycott of the representative bodies. In the end they succeeded because of the evolving inter-ethnic solidarity and by showing that they could act together. The experience created a bond of friendship and this enabled them to resolve contentious matters during negotiations for a new constitution and independence. Part 3 will appear tomorrow; Part 1 ‘Birth of Umno and Malayan Union’ appeared yesterday. Dr Lee Kam Hing’s essay is originally titled ‘Forging Inter-ethnic Cooperation: The Political and Constitutional Process towards Independence, 1951-1957’ and published in the book Multiethnic Malaysia — Past Present and Future (2009). CPI with permission from the author is reproducing his essay in three parts for online reading in our website. Today’s Part 2 is as above. Dr Lee is research director at Star Publications. He was visiting Harvard-Yenching research scholar at Harvard University, and visiting scholar at Wofson College, Cambridge University. He was previously history professor of Universiti Malaya. Footnotes: [12] Malay Mail. 15 February 1952 [13] Straits Times, 20 January 1952 [14] Singapore Standard, 19 February 1952 [15] Tan Cheng Lock to Col. H.S.Lee, 29 February 1952, Malacca, in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur [16] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 5 March 1952; H.S.Lee to Tengku Abdul Rahman, 7 March1952, both letters in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur. [17] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 3 March 1952, Kuala Lumpur, unpublished HS.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur [18] Straits Times, 19 February 1952 [19] Tan Cheng Lock to Col H.S.Lee, 22 February 1952, Singapore, in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur [20] Dato Onn Jaafar to Col H.S.Lee, 4 September 1951, Kuala Lumpur, Unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur. [21] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 18 February 1952, in unpublished H.S. Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur [22] Straits Times, 20 January 1952 [23] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 5 March 1952, Kuala Lumpur, in unpublished H.S.private papers, Kuala Lumpur [24] Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.179-220 [25] Joseph M.Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Monograph No 31 of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2002, pp 35-63

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.

Would the police DARE take action?

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Friday, 05 February 2010 Super Admin

 

However, considering Nasir Safar’s ‘special status’, the AG also can’t decide on the matter. The AG will have to ‘seek guidance’ from the Prime Minister as to whether to charge Nasir Safar or not.


THE CORRIDORS OF POWER


Raja Petra Kamarudin

  45 police reports have been made against Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s former special officer, Nasir Safar. So the police have no choice but to ‘record his statement’. That is the SOP of the Malaysian police force. If a police report is made against you then they must record your statement.

  I remember, last year, IGP Musa Hassan said that they are not able to take any action based on rumours and Internet postings. A police report must first be made before the police can take action. And the action to take would be to record the statement of the one the police report has been made against. Then they will investigate the matter and decide if a crime has been committed.

  Allow me to digress a bit here. In my own criminal cases, it was the police who made a police report against me. In other words, no police report was made against me. And since they can’t take action against me unless a police report is first lodged, the police themselves made a police report against me.

So the police do not need anyone to make a police report before they take action against you. If they really want to take action but no police report has been made, the police themselves can make that police report, as what happened to me.

Okay, now back to the issue at hand. If the police -- after the statement has been recorded and an investigation has been completed -- is of the view that a crime has been committed, they still can’t take action yet. Instead, they must refer the matter to the Attorney-General, who will then decide if there is any case to prosecute.

  Assuming the AG feels the evidence is not strong enough or they do not quite have a case, then the file will be stamped NFA (No Further Action) and the matter will be closed.

That is how the Malaysian system works.

  If I want to write about this matter in greater detail then this article would certainly run into 100 pages. Many of you will for sure not read any piece that is 100 pages long. As it is, I am already receiving complaints from my dear friend Chris that my four- to five-page articles are too cheong hei. Imagine what she will say about a 100-page article.

So, as not to annoy Chris, I will try to keep this piece within five pages or so. After all, this is not a thesis for my law degree. In case you are not already aware, I am practicing law without a law degree just like I write about Islam without first obtaining a degree from the International Islamic University (UIA).

  And so that I can keep this article within the required length, I would like to refer to just ONE case. This one case should be sufficient to demonstrate the point I am trying to get across.

In 1999, the Parti Keadilan Nasional Youth Leader, Ezam Mohd Nor, called a press conference to reveal the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA and now called MACC) investigation papers against Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz. The ACA investigation revealed that Rafidah had committed an act of corruption.

  Now, we must also remember, around that time Anwar Ibrahim too was indicted for corruption and was found guilty and was sentenced to six years' jail. But Anwar’s ‘crime’ involved no monetary gain. Rafidah’s crime did.

  Rafidah never denied the act. She in fact admitted it. But she explained that she sat in the meeting that approved the shares to her own son-in-law because Mahathir’s son’s application for shares was also being decided at the same time. According to Rafidah in her press statement, Mahathir had instructed her to make sure that his son got those shares.

So she sat in the meeting to ensure that the committee did just that, approve the shares for Mahathir’s son. When it came to approving the shares for her own son-in-law, she abstained from voting due to ‘conflict of interest’, although she did not leave the room when they deliberated on the matter.

  Rafidah did not need to vote on the matter. All she needed to do was to sit there and no officer would dare vote against her son-in-law. No government officer in his right mind would dare oppose giving millions' worth of shares to his or her own minister’s son-in-law.

  

  If you personally know Rafidah then you will know that she is a very strong-willed woman. She is not known as ‘The Iron Lady’ for nothing. All she needs to do is to stare at you and your balls will shrink (or tits, if you are a woman). She even dared challenge Mahathir and whacked him good and proper.

Anyway, the ACA and AG were both of the view that Rafidah committed a crime by sitting in the meeting that approved the shares to her own son-in-law. And the AG endorsed the ACA investigation papers and recommended that Rafidah be arrested and charged for corruption.

  But before any Minister, Deputy Minister, or any ‘big shot’, can be arrested and charged, the AG must first obtain the approval of the Prime Minister. And the Prime Minister then, Dr Mahathir, said no. So the file was closed with a NFA stamp on the front cover.

The ACA said charge. The AG said charge. The PM said no charge. And that is what finally happened. No charge.

   And Ezam revealed this entire episode to the public during a press conference in 1999. And he showed the reporters the documents to prove his allegation. Ezam was not lying. He was telling the truth. But the documents he revealed to the media had RAHSIA stamped on them. So Ezam was arrested and charged under the Official Secrets Act. He was then put on trial, found guilty, and sentenced to two years' jail.

  Ezam was actually under Internal Security Act detention in the Kamunting Detention Centre at that time. So all they needed to do was to transfer him from Kamunting to the Kajang Prison to serve out his sentence. He never saw freedom until two years later.

  For the government to win its case against Ezam they had to admit that the documents are genuine and are not fakes. Therefore, in that same breath, the government confirmed Ezam’s story about Rafidah. To send Ezam to jail they must admit the authenticity of the documents. If they say Ezam is lying, then how to charge him under the Official Secrets Act?

  Okay, the police are now going to record the statement of this Nasir Safar chap. Now, whether the police investigation uncovers any crime committed by Nasir Safar is one thing. But even if they do, they still can’t charge him yet. They need to hand the file over to the AG for him to decide whether to charge Nasir Safar or not.

  However, considering Nasir Safar’s ‘special status’, the AG also can’t decide on the matter. The AG will have to ‘seek guidance’ from the Prime Minister as to whether to charge Nasir Safar or not.

Okay, that is one issue. Next would be the recorded statement made by private investigator Bala concerning the Altantuya murder. During his detention and interrogation, Bala told the police that Nasir Safar was there when Sirul and Azilah picked up Altantuya and later murdered her.

  A police report was made. The required ‘recorded statement’ was made. Will the police now look into this as well or is this one more case of NFA?

  I would place RM1,000 on a bet that BOTH cases will end up with a NFA stamp on them. Want to take this bet? I could certainly do with the money.

  Oh, and before I forget, read Raja Nazrin’s statement below: Do Not Mock the Law. Nazrin should be addressing this statement to the police and AG.

  Oh, and one more thing, the Malacca CPO, Senior Assistant Commissioner (I) Datuk Mohd Rodwan Mohd Yusof, mentioned in the Star news report below, is the police officer who met Saiful in the Concorde Hotel two days BEFORE Anwar was alleged to have sodomised him. Rodwan was also accused of fabricating evidence during the Sodomy 1 trail as well. 

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Cops to take statement from Nasir

Police will record a statement from the Prime Minister’s former special officer Datuk Nasir Safar over his alleged racist remarks during a 1Malaysia seminar here on Tuesday.

The statement is expected to be taken from Nasir, who is being investigated under the Sedition Act, in Kuala Lumpur some time on Friday.

Malacca CPO Senior Assistant Commissioner (I) Datuk Mohd Rodwan Mohd Yusof said police have almost wrapped up their investigation.

“We are speeding up the investigation as it involves a case of public interest.

“The investigation is about 85% complete and we have interviewed 30 people so far,” he told reporters here on Friday.

He added that police had received a total of 45 reports against Nasir -- 13 in Perak, nine in Malacca, five in Kedah, four in Penang, Pahang and Selangor, and three in Negri Sembilan and Johor.

He said police are expected to complete their probe by early next week before submitting the investigation papers to the deputy public prosecutor.

It was learned that among those called up for their statement were a state assemblyman, state MIC members, six journalists, officers from the State Special Affairs Department, the venue management and participants of the seminar.

Nasir, who was a speaker at the Rapat 1Malaysia seminar at the Melaka International Trade Centre in Ayer Keroh on Tuesday, caused a furore when he allegedly uttered racist remarks resulting in several local MIC and MCA members walking out of the hall.

He subsequently explained that he did not intend to make any racist remarks and apologised, following which he tendered his resignation. – The Star

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Raja Nazrin: Do Not Mock the Law

The Raja Muda of Perak, Raja Dr Nazrin Shah, today reminded legal practitioners not to mock nor smear the country's laws.

He said as legal practitioners, they should not only refer to or value a law when it benefited them, but dismiss or mock it if they felt it did not benefit them.

Raja Nazrin said this was because laws were important in ensuring continuity and credibility of an administration or government.

"Your level of excellence and honour in the legal profession in the public eye in future will depend on your wisdom and disciplined practice from now," he said at the presentation of the Certificate of Legal Practice issued by the Legal Profession Qualifying Board, Malaysia, to 238 recipients, here, today.

Raja Nazrin said if justice failed to be effectively and professionally managed, society and the nation would be heading towards destruction with crime becoming much more rampant.

"The legal enforcement machinery is seen to be getting weaker, perhaps personal interest are above professional interest now. Those who make professional interest their prioroty are a minority, who are sidelined from the main decision-making process in an organisation.

"The highest-level mechanism is also seen as increasingly weak to the extent that the public have come to regard the court as mere drama stage and losing their respect and trust.

"This scenario is no creation, but a precursor to the downfall of many Third World countries. The people suffer while the countries' top leaders flee and become exiles in other countries or hunted down for their wrongdoings."

The Perak Raja Muda said justice could not be administered in society or country if the laws contained elements of oppression and giving privileges to the powerful to dominate the weak and the rich to oppress the poor.

In fact, he said, there would be no justice if the legal machinery was impotent.

"A country's sovereignty depends on its seriousness in honouring its laws mirrored by its firmness and never compromising with practices that disrespect the law, and by its intolerance towards malpractices like misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, power abuse and corruption.

"There is sovereignty of the law if there is a strong spirit to uphold the law and truth as a way of life."

He said sovereignty of the law could also be guaranteed as long as the process of meting justice at the courts was not marred by unethical practices done from outside the courts to influence the decisions.

Raja Nazrin said managing justice required the collective role of various quarters, besides the professional understanding and respect for the ethics of every agency or individual involved.

"If the investigating and prosecuting officers do not produce quality work and show a high level of professionalism, if the defence counsel violate their professional code of ethics and if judges sacrifice the principle of truth, then justice will be compromised," he said. – Malaysian Digest

* This article is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The blog owner does not endorse the view unless specified.